作者
盧佳慧^* (國立台北大學經濟系)

Author
Chia-Hui Lu^* (Department of Economics, National Taipei University)

中文摘要
如果政府對不同能力的勞工皆設有最低工資，當工人的議價能力較小的時候，不僅低技術的勞工適用最低工資，連高技術勞工也適用其最低工資。除此之外，若政府同時考慮課徵薪資所得稅與最低工資， 當工人的議價能力較小的時候，政府應該對高技術勞工課徵薪資所得稅，並應為低技術的勞工設定最低工資。在這種情況下，我們可以得到低技術勞工最適的最低工資值。

Abstract
If the government sets different minimum wages for different types of workers, then the minimum wage is not only binding for unskilled labor, but also for skilled labor, when workers' bargaining power is smaller than its elasticity in the matching function. Moreover, if we consider a tax, the government should tax the labor income of skilled labor and should set a minimum wage for unskilled labor when the workers' bargaining power is relatively low. In this situation, a binding minimum wage is optimal.

中文關鍵字
最低工資；勞動搜尋；失業；福利

Keywords
Minimum Wage; Search and Matching; Unemployment; Welfare