作者
黃偉倫^* (中華技術學院財務金融系)
孫立群 (國立臺灣大學農業經濟系)

作者
Wei-Lung Huang^* (Department of Finance, China Institute of Technology)
Lih-Chyun Sun Department of Agricultural Economics, National Taiwan University

中文摘要
本文利用合作賽局探討兩地方政府的環境資源管理協議，藉此了解中央政府介入與否之談判方式對賽局結果的影響。模型結果證明，外生決定中央介入的協議結果（那許均衡解）是兩地方都選擇讓談判失敗（最差解）。當中央介入與否及談判失敗機率為內生決定時，地方會讓中央不介入談判，並選擇談判失敗（失敗機率為一）。

Abstract
This paper develops a cooperative game in which two local authorities negotiate a cross-regional environmental resource management agreement (CRERMA). We examine the possible strategic advantage enjoyed by a local authority when central authority negotiates CRERMA and it doesn't. The results proved when central authority is exogenously forced to negotiate CRERMA; Nash equilibrium is that two local authorities both choose to break CRERMA (the worst solution). When each local authority could choose the break probability of CRERMA and to let central authority negotiates CRERMA or not, we find that two local authorities both choose not to let central authority negotiate and to let CRERMA break (the break probability is one).

中文關鍵字
跨行政區域環境資源管理協議；中央政府；地方政府

Keywords
Cross-Regional Environmental Resource Management Agreement; Central Authority; Local Authority